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The Occurrence/Occurring Distinction
It has been contended that an event as a whole does not occur but, rather, is only occurring when any one of its temporal parts occurs1 I shall consider here the mereological implications of drawing a distinction between the time of an event’s occurrence- its duration- and the times of its occurring- the duration of any one of its proper temporal parts.  In particular, I intend to see whether it allows one to avoid having co-located events in one’s ontology.  The problem entailed by this distinction is that, even if it were true that a composite event is only occurring at any time at which one of its proper parts occurs, so that they are just partially identical, what are we to say of a putative atomic temporal part of an event, one whose duration is no longer than what is temporally required for a change under a determinable to occur and, thus, has no proper part at which it is only occurring?  Here, the occurs/is occurring distinction would be inapplicable. [Thus, unless one assumes an anti-atomistic view according to which an event must be composed of proper parts (that are the shorter events) that make up its occurring, which entails that the occurring of an event is always a proper part of its own occurrence when any event of which it is a part would be occurring, we would have two events occurring simultaneously in the same quality space were we not to identify an atomic temporal part of an event with the event of which it is a part, since the former occurs as it is occurring.]  This co-location of occurrings would be as ontologically profligate as the co-location of occurrences the distinction would obviate.
One may avoid having to answer this question by denying that an event’s atomic parts are partless, i.e., by advancing the just mentioned anti-atomistic view of events.  Further one would forced to accept this position, independently of the concern to avoid co-located occurrings, by a certain handling of the problem of direct change, that is, the having of one determinate P and the subsequent having another determinate Q without the intermediate having of any other determinate falling under the same determinable.  Such a change would take place in a “discrete” quality space: one in which there are pairs of properties between which there lies no intermediate properties.  [The quality spaces in which one would go from having gray to black hair and one to two strikes are examples of this type of quality space.  Music eg and fact that can happen even in indscrt one] The following argument, however, seems to show that it would be impossible for changes to take place therein:

1.	Time is dense; between any two instants there are other times. (Assumption)
2.	If object o goes from having P for the last time at t to having Q for the first time at t’, then there is a time t* between t and t’. (1)
3.	If o’s change from P to Q could be direct, then there is no property within the P/Q quality space that o has at t* (Definition of direct change)
4.	O goes from having P for the last time at t to having Q for the first time at t’ (Assumption)
5.	There is a time t* between t and t’. (2, 4)
6.	If there is a time t* between t and t’, then there is a property within the P/Q quality space had by o at t*.  (Assumption)
7.	There is a property within the P/Q quality space had by o at t*. (5, 6)
8.	O’s change from P to Q could not be direct. (7)

One might responds to this argument by noting that if a direct change could occur at an instant, instead of requiring more than one instant to occur (in effect, if 4 were false), it would not present a problem, since then there would be no need to account for o’s status within the P/Q quality space during the interval between t and t’ that must exist if time is dense.2  Given, however, that a change is a “process,” a “transition” from one property to another, there arises the problem of explaining the possibility of direct change.  Lombard’s solution is to maintain that “such (a change consists) of other events that are dense changes in (a dense quality space).”  That is because all the “ultimate” quality spaces in which events occur are dense, with no direct changes taking place therein.3 Partless atomic events are thus ruled out.  Instead, atomic events are, relative to a scientific theory T, (and leaving out several details not germane to the present discussion) those temporally continuous events involving changes to T’s atomic objects occurring within T’s ultimate quality spaces.4
There are several problems with this approach.  To begin with, it saddles Lombard with anti-atomism regarding events.  He believes that, “short of trying to take (seriously) the idea of an instantaneous event,” maintaining this view is unavoidable.5 I presently shall show that this dilemma is false.  The second problem with it is that Lombard offers, in his own words, “no direct, independent argument” for the claim that all events are composed of dense changes.6 It is, thus, merely an expedient for solving the problem of direct change.  Sans such an argument, then, it should be abandoned if a more plausible solution to that problem can be found.  Thirdly, since an argument parallel to the one just given can be constructed to show that physical objects cannot touch, Lombard must accept that conclusion as well.  Though he is willing to do so, we have here another move that had best be avoided if possible.7 In the case of events, he does not think that it can be eschewed without allowing that events can occur instantaneously.  But that cannot be right, since there are other premises in the above argument one can challenge.
Finally, and most importantly, Lombard does not so much account for direct change as deny its occurrence.  Any direct change, he is committed to saying, is merely an appearance, since the difference between the quality space in which it would occur and the quality space in which an indirect change would occur precludes him from identifying it with an indirect change (given his criterion of event identity discussed below).  What really happens in such a case is a series of indirect changes.  His position here is eliminativist rather than reductionist: it is akin to the view that the physical objects of “folk ontology” are nothing more than collections of sub-atomic particles; they do not exist, so that the question of whether or not they are identical to such aggregates need not arise.  When Lombard says that direct changes are “really composed” of indirect changes, he cannot mean (something analogous to) what the anti-reductionist regarding physical objects holds, for the latter accepts the reality of physical objects, she simply believes that they exist ‘over and above’ that of which they are composed.  I should think that a solution to the problem of direct change that takes seriously the possibility of its occurrence would be preferable to one that treats it as an illusion. 
I can make out two alternatives.  First, there is the option of taking the above argument as a reductio on the thesis that time is dense, which, after all, is arguably not a part of common sense, unlike the belief in direct change.  (And even if time were intuitively considered dense, this response would be more plausible than Lombard’s, which makes direct change only apparent and requires atomic events to have parts, since its advocate must abdicate fewer intuitions than Lombard is required to give up.)  If time were discrete, then there would be no need to account for o’s status in regards to the P/Q quality space during the interval between t and t’.  We could hold that, since the change is direct, the only times involved are t and t’: they would be the times at which the event began and ended respectively as well as the times during which it took place, making it, in Lombard’s terms, both an occurrence and an occurring.  It would, thus, be an event having no proper parts at which it is occurring, raising the question Lombard had hoped to avoid of whether or not its occurring would be identical to the simultaneous occurring in the same quality space of any event of which it were an atomic part. 
	A more plausible option still would be to deny premise 6.  Why should an object changing in a quality space exemplify a quality belonging to that space at every instant at which that event is occurring?  If the quality space in question is dense, then, assuming time is also dense, there would be a one-to-one correlation between the instants that make up the interval at which the event occurs and properties that make up the quality space.  But such a correlation would not obtain between the instants that make up a dense period of time and the properties composing a discrete quality space.  (Costume change analogy)  Thus, if o goes from P at t to Q at t’ in a discrete quality space, the instants between t and t’ (which we are supposing to be infinite) must be times at which o is devoid of any properties belonging to the P/Q quality space.  To suppose, as Lombard does, that between t and t’ “(o) must have a quality in (such a) space”8 seems tantamount to denying the existence of discrete quality spaces, question begging in the present context.  Real, not merely illusory, direct change is, thus, possible.  In the bargain we secure partless atomic events, since a change from P to (its neighbor) Q in a discrete quality space will not break down into the occurrence of further events making up its occurring.  Since it does not have a proper part at which it is occurring, it will occur at the same time as it is occurring.  Thus, the question will again arise as to whether or not as an occurring it is identical to the simultaneous occurring of any event of which it is an atomic part.  In the context of individuating events, therefore, the occurs/is occurring distinction cannot help Lombard avoid the dilemma of accepting either co-location or the identity of a thing with one of its parts.
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8.	 Ibid., p. 138.  Here is that argument:
1.	If o and o’ touch, then there must be a place, p, at which they come in contact.
2.	Two objects can not simultaneously occupy the same place.	
3.	Thus, there is no place p occupied by both o and o’
4.	O occupies p.
5.	Thus, O’ occupies p’ and p  p’.
6.	Space is dense; between any two spaces there are other spaces.
7.	Thus, there are spaces p’’, p’’’ between p and p’.
8.	Those spaces are occupied by neither p nor p’.
9.	If there are spaces between the spaces occupied by two objects, they do not come in contact.
10.	 Thus, p and p’ do not come in contact.
11.	 Thus, p and p’ do not touch (e.g. my hand can not touch my computer’s keyboard).
		
The denial of 6 seems to be a more plausible rebuttal to the argument against direct change than those that are presented below.  Rejecting 9, the analogue to the second response to that argument, which I consider more attractive than the denial of the density of time, is out of the question, as it is true by definition.
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